

are recognized as retail sales or services in the particular industry, we must inquire into what is meant by the terms “recognized” and “in the particular industry,” and into the functions of the Secretary and the courts in determining whether the sales are recognized as retail in the industry.

§ 779.323 Particular industry.

In order to determine whether a sale or service is recognized as a retail sale or service in the “particular industry” it is necessary to identify the “particular” industry to which the sale or service belongs. Some situations are clear and present no difficulty. The sale of clothes, for example, belongs to the clothing industry and the sale of ice belongs to the ice industry. In other situations, a sale or service is not so easily earmarked and a wide area of overlapping exists. Household appliances are sold by public utilities as well as by department stores and by stores specializing in the sale of such goods; and tires are sold by manufacturers’ outlets, by independent tire dealers and by other types of outlets. In these cases, a fair determination as to whether a sale or service is recognized as retail in the “particular” industry may be made by giving to the term “industry” its broad statutory definition as a “group of industries” and thus including all industries wherein a significant quantity of the particular product or service is sold. For example, in determining whether a sale of lumber is a retail sale, it is the recognition the sale of lumber occupies in the lumber industry generally which decides its character rather than the recognition such sales occupies in any branch of that industry.

§ 779.324 Recognition “in.”

The express terms of the statutory provision requires the “recognition” to be “in” the industry and not “by” the industry. Thus, the basis for the determination as to what is recognized as retail “in the particular industry” is wider and greater than the views of an employer in a trade or business, or an association of such employers. It is clear from the legislative history and judicial pronouncements that it was not the intent of this provision to dele-

gate to employers in any particular industry the power to exempt themselves from the requirements of the Act. It was emphasized in the debates in Congress that while the views of an industry are significant and material in determining what is recognized as a retail sale in a particular industry, the determination is not dependent on those views alone. (See 95 Cong. Rec. pp. 12501, 12502, and 12510; *Wirtz v. Steepleton General Tire Co.*, 383 U.S. 190; *Mitchell v. City Ice Co.*, 273 F. 2d 560 (CA-5); *Durkin v. Casa Baldrich, Inc.*, 111 F. Supp. 71 (DCPR) affirmed 214 F. 2d 703 (CA-1); see also *Aetna Finance Co. v. Mitchell*, 247 F. 2d 190 (CA-1).) Such a determination must take into consideration the well-settled habits of business, traditional understanding and common knowledge. These involve the understanding and knowledge of the purchaser as well as the seller, the wholesaler as well as the retailer, the employee as well as the employer, and private and governmental research and statistical organizations. The understanding of all these and others who have knowledge of recognized classifications in an industry, would all be relevant in the determination of the question.

§ 779.325 Functions of the Secretary and the courts.

It may be necessary for the Secretary in the performance of his duties under the Act, to determine in some instances whether a sale or service is recognized as a retail sale or particular industry. In the exceptional case where the determination cannot be made on the basis of common knowledge or readily accessible information, the Secretary may gather the information needed for the purpose of making such determinations. Available information on usage and practice in the industry is carefully considered in making such determinations, but the “word-usage of the industry” does not have controlling force; the Secretary “cannot be hamstrung by the terminology of a particular trade” and possesses considerable discretion as the one responsible for the actual administration of the Act. (*Wirtz v. Steepleton General Tire Co.*, 383 U.S. 190; and see 95 Cong. Rec. 12501-12502, 12510.) The responsibility